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MINING MEDIATION RULES FOR REPRESENTATION 
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES* 
 
Harold I. Abramson** 
 
Buried in mediation rules can be found a few surprises, some desirable and 
some not.  The rules, usually few in number and quite compact, can contain 
unexpected opportunities and pitfalls when developing a mediation representation 
plan.1 This article considers several distinctive issues2 that can arise when 
applying mediation rules to international mediations.  
 
I. SELECTING A NEUTRAL MEDIATOR 
 
How do you select a mediator in a cross-border dispute whom both sides view 
as neutral? Parties must be confident in the mediator’s neutrality so that they will 
trust disclosing information and trust the mediator’s initiatives. Even though 
professional mediators know to maintain scrupulously their neutrality, parties may 
still be skeptical of any mediator from the country of another party.  
Mediation rules occasionally include a default mediator selection process 
designed for parties from different countries.   
The mediator from a third country approach is used in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. It suggests that the person recommending a mediator “shall take into account 
                                                                                                                           
* A version of this article was published in 1 J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 40 (Germany, 
2004).   This article is based on a study of seventeen sets of mediation rules that were 
issued by the United Nations and dispute resolution organizations in Europe, the United 
States, Egypt, Hong Kong, and China. Next year, an expanded version of this article will 
be published that will analyze over fifty mediation rules from every region of the globe. 
** The author, a professor at Touro Law Center in Huntington, New York, publishes, 
teaches and trains in the areas of domestic and international mediation, methods for 
resolving disputes, and representing clients in mediations. In addition to teaching courses 
on dispute resolution, he teaches domestic and international sales, international business 
and trade, and remedies. His email address is hala@tourolaw.edu. 
1 For a full examination of how to represent clients in mediations, including how to 
prepare a mediation representation plan, see HAROLD ABRAMSON, MEDIATION 
REPRESENTATION-ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS (2004).  
2 For a fuller discussion of a number of distinctive issues that can arise in international 
mediations, see Harold Abramson, International Dispute Resolution, in ALAN RAU ET AL., 
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 929-938 (3d ed. 2002) and Harold Abramson, 
International Mediation Basics, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION Ch.II.1 (Rufus Rhoades et al., eds.  2002).  
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the advisability of appointing a conciliator of a nationality other than the 
nationalities of the parties.”3  
The one from each country approach is taken in a Chinese rule where each 
party appoints a mediator and the two mediators jointly conciliate the case.4 If you 
elect the co-mediation solution, rules can provide different approaches to selecting 
the mediators. The Chinese and a German rule adopt the international arbitration 
model of party-appointed third parties; each party appoints a conciliator.5 But the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, while preferring this approach in earlier drafts and 
characterizing it as the “prevailing view,”6 in its Draft Guide, ultimately rejected 
this approach in favor of requiring parties to “endeavour to reach agreement 
on…conciliators” unless they agreed on a different procedure.7  
A third approach, implicit in rules that are silent on selecting international 
mediators, is to select a qualified mediator in the location of the mediation. 
Realizing that the mediator has no decision-making power, a party may not be too 
concerned about the country of the mediator as long as the mediator has excellent 
credentials and experience.  
Ultimately, you will have to come to terms with what selection process will 
give you confidence in the mediator. Fortunately, these concerns are not as 
weighty in mediations as in arbitrations. In mediations, you have the safeguard of 
simply walking away from the mediation if you lose trust in the mediator, while in 
arbitrations, you must demonstrate prejudice as a basis for disqualifying the 
neutral. 
 
II. CHOOSING ROLES FOR THE MEDIATOR 
 
There is no more important decision in mediation representation than 
choosing the roles of your mediator. You want to be sure that you select a 
mediator who will employ the mix of approaches and techniques that you think 
                                                                                                                           
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
on International Commercial Conciliation, Art. 5(4) (2002) [hereinafter the Model Law], 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc-e.pdf. 
4 China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and China 
Chamber of International Commerce (CCOIC), CONCILIATION RULES, Arts. 9(3), 12, 
(2000), available at www.cmac.org.cn/BCC/a19.html (last visited on January 28, 2005). 
5 German Institution of Arbitration, DIS Mediation/Conciliation Rules, Sec. 7(2), 
(January 1, 2002), available at www.dis-arb.de (last visited on January 28, 2005). 
6 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Draft Guide 
to Enactment and Use of the UNICTRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation, 35th Sess. at para. 46, U.N. Doc. A/CN .9/514 (May 27, 2002), [hereinafter 
the Draft Guide]. 
7 The Model Law, supra note 3, Art. 5(2). 
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are warranted.  Hidden in the flexible language of mediation rules can be found 
particular and sometimes unexpected mediator roles that can impact the way you 
represent your client.  
In international mediations, you should carefully clarify the roles of the 
mediator because unusual variations of mediation can occasionally be 
encountered. In one atypical arrangement, the mediator might investigate the facts 
and law and issue a written report containing her recommendations.8 In another 
uncommon arrangement, each party may designate a mediator and then the 
mediators meet with each other to hammer out a resolution that is presented to the 
parties for their confirmation.9 You should guard against surprises by specifically 
discussing the roles of the mediator that each side contemplates. This inquiry is 
essential in order to avoid cross-cultural misunderstandings.   
This vital discussion of mediator roles is not left to chance by the Oslo 
Chamber of Commerce Rules: “The Mediator, in cooperation with the parties, 
shall see to it that an Agreement is made”10 that covers this subject. This 
prophylactic measure is a particularly appealing one because it can ensure that the 
parties face essential design questions and formulate a suitable process before the 
first mediation session. The more typical approach, however, gives parties the 
option of negotiating the roles. And, if they do nothing, the default process in the 
rules would control. The default rules usually give the mediator broad authority to 
do what is “appropriate” along with some other particular powers such as 
caucusing (meeting privately with one side). 
One mediator power that can potentially overshadow the entire mediation 
process is the power to recommend settlements. This mediator power, which can 
occasionally be found in rules, has the potential to singularly pigeonhole and 
shape your entire mediation representation strategy.11  Realizing that the mediator 
may formulate settlement proposals, you may be induced to approach the 
                                                                                                                           
8 See Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of International 
Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 578, 585-87 (1991/92) and 
Tobi Dress, International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation, 10 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP.L.J. 569, 574 (1988). 
9 See WILLIAM FOX, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 193 (1992) and 
Reif, supra note 8 at 632-33. 
10 Oslo Chamber of Commerce, RULES OF THE ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION INSTITUTE OF THE OSLO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Art. 34, (2003), available 
at www.Chamber.no/tekster.cfm?artid=53. 
11 For a more a more in-depth analysis of the impact that mediator evaluation can have 
on advocacy, see Harold Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A Model 
of Client Representation, 10 HARV. NEG. L. R. (2005)(forthcoming) (The article considers 
how to implement a “constricted problem-solving” approach to advocacy when the 
mediator may engage in evaluation). 
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mediation more like a judicial process than a negotiation. Instead of viewing the 
mediator as a facilitator, you may view the mediator as a decision maker. Instead 
of formulating a negotiation strategy based on meeting parties’ interests, you may 
be impelled to formulate a strategy designed to persuade the mediator to 
recommend favorable settlement proposals.  
The new UNCITRAL Model Law, for instance, gives the mediator the power 
to “make proposals for settlement,” “at any stage of the conciliation 
proceedings.”12 This provision is especially surprising because the Model Law 
also makes clear that the mediator cannot act as an arbitrator without approval of 
the parties,13 stating reasons, in the Draft Guide, that apply equally to barring 
mediators from making proposals.  
The UNCITRAL’s Draft Guide to Enactment recognized the dilemma for the 
advocate when a mediator might subsequently act as an arbitrator by pointing out 
that “[a] party may be reluctant to strive actively for a settlement...if it has to take 
into account the possibility that if the conciliation is not successful, the conciliator 
might be appointed as an arbitrator…”14 The same underlying point applies when 
the conciliator might formulate proposals. Permit me to indulge in editing the 
Guide: “A party may be reluctant to participate candidly strive actively for a 
settlement...if it has to take into account the possibility that if the conciliation is 
not successful, the conciliator might formulate a settlement proposal based on 
what was learned during the conciliation be appointed as an arbitrator…” (edits in 
italics)  
The risk of the recommendation power overshadowing the mediation can be 
reduced by the type of carefully crafted approach adopted in the CEDR Mediation 
Rules. The Rules give the mediator conditional recommendation authority:   
 
If the Parties are unable to reach a settlement in the negotiations at the Mediation, 
and only if all the Parties so request and the Mediator agrees, the Mediator will 
produce for the Parties a non-binding recommendation on terms of settlement. 
This will not attempt to anticipate what a court might order but will set out what 
the Mediator suggests are appropriate settlement terms in all of the 
circumstances.15  
 
                                                                                                                           
12 Model Law, supra note 3, Art. 6(4). Similar authority is given the mediator by the 
AAA International Mediation Rules.  See American Arbitration Association, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, Rule M-10, (July 1, 
2003), available at www.adr.org. 
13 The Model Law, supra note 3, Art. 12. 
14 Draft Guide, supra note 6 at para. 70. 
15 Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) MODEL MEDIATION PROCEDURE 
AND AGREEMENT, para. 12 (2002), available at www.cedr.co.uk/library/documents/ 
MMPA.8thedition.pdf.  
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CEDR’s Guidance Notes state that “[t]he intention of paragraph 12 is that the 
Mediator will cease to play an entirely facilitative role only if the negotiations in 
the Mediation are deadlocked. Giving a settlement recommendation may be 
perceived by a Party as undermining the Mediator’s neutrality and for this reason 
the Mediator may not agree to this course of action.”16  
Another mediation rule that is quite common bars a mediator from switching 
to the role of arbitrator unless both parties specifically authorize the mediator to 
switch roles. The temptation to ask the mediator to switch roles to resolve 
conclusively the dispute can be considerable when the parties have reached an 
impasse after spending a day or more together mediating the dispute. This 
temptation can be especially powerful when fueled by the cultural practices of one 
side. For instance, consider the Conciliation Rules of the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”) and the China Chamber of 
International Commerce (“CCOIC”). The specific wording of Rule 21 starkly 
reveals the attitude of the Rules: “If conciliation fails, the conciliator(s) may be 
appointed by one of the parties as arbitrator(s) in the subsequent arbitration 
proceedings, unless such appointment is opposed by the other party (emphasis 
added).”17 The Introduction to the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) Website, in commenting favorably on 
combining arbitration and conciliation, points out, 
 
Many years of practice has [sic] indicated that the combination of arbitration with 
conciliation can make good use of the advantages of both arbitration and 
conciliation, so as to settle disputes more efficiently and turn hostility into 
friendship. It may also save parties expenses and help to maintain the friendly 
relations and cooperation between them. This practice in Chinese arbitration has 
received worldwide attention and approval.18  
 
The convenient benefits and compromising risks posed by the same neutral 
serving two roles are widely known.19 If you elect this scheme, you should 
consider adopting a number of protocols for minimizing its risks, protocols that 
                                                                                                                           
16 CEDR Guidance Notes for Model Mediation Procedure and Agreement, The 
Mediation 9-12 (October 2002). Also see CPR MEDIATION PROCEDURE FOR BUSINESS 
DISPUTES IN EUROPE, Rule 6 (1996)(limits the recommendation power to after the parties 
fail to reach a settlement and after parties consent to receive a mediator’s final settlement 
proposal). 
17 See CCPIT and CCOIC RULES, supra note 4. 
18 Introduction, Section XV. Combination of Arbitration and Conciliation, available 
at www.cietac.org. 
19 See Harold Abramson, Protocols for International Arbitrators who Dare to Settle 
Cases, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB 1, 3-4 (1999). 
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are designed to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of each dispute resolution 
process.20  
 
III. ENSURING CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
 
Confidentiality, one of the great benefits of mediation, can be less secure 
internationally than you might be accustomed to at home due to the less developed 
and untested laws in some countries. Even though virtually every set of mediation 
rules provides confidentiality, the scope of protection can vary from set to set, 
although you should be aware of an incipient effort to promote uniformity in 
mediation rules.21 You ought to assess carefully whether the rules that you are 
considering provide sufficient protection and will be enforced in relevant 
jurisdictions. 
 
IV. ENFORCING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
 
In cross-border disputes, you need to give extra attention to how any resulting 
settlement agreement will be enforced.  In domestic disputes, you can rely on your 
local court system for enforcement. However, pursuing cross-border enforcement 
in the local court of a foreign country can take more time and expense and 
sometimes can be less reliable.  
An intelligent and efficacious solution is offered by the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce Rules. Parties can agree to appoint the mediator as an arbitrator and 
“request him to confirm the settlement agreement in an arbitral award.”22 The 
resulting “consent” award can then be enforced in numerous other jurisdictions 
under the relatively reliable procedures of the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.23  
 
                                                                                                                           
20 See id. at 7-15 (The twelve suggested protocols, designed for when an arbitrator 
mediates, need some modifications for when the mediator arbitrates). 
21 The Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, adopted by UNCITRAL 
and recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, is designed to 
promote uniformity in mediation law among nations. The Uniform Mediation Act, 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 
2001 and amended in August 2003 to coordinate with the UNCITRAL Model Law, is 
being considered for adoption by a number of states in the United States.  
22 RULES OF THE MEDIATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, Art. 12, (April 1, 1999), available at www.sccinstitute.com.  
23 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1959).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
I was surprised to discover surprises in these mundane and essential mediation 
rules. They can open up opportunities and present obstacles when one is 
representing clients in international mediations. Do not leave home without 
studying them.  

